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1 
 
When I was a classics major in college in the 1980s, everyone read 
Thucydides’ Peloponnesian War through the Reagan-era Cold War 
lens:  Athens was the U.S., Sparta the U.S.S.R.  The lesson was 
supposedly about bi-polar superpower politics, and the wrong 
team won. 
 
 
2 
 
It was during this time that I first discovered Steven Forde’s 1989 
treatment of Thucydides, Ambition to Rule:  Alcibiades and the 
Politics of Imperialism in Thucydides.  Several of my professors 
praised it, although never assigning it, in class.  Hearing them talk 
about it, Forde’s book fit the dominant Cold War paradigm quite 
well.  Infatuated with that paradigm and the predictive power that 
it appeared to offer through Thucydides, I found and bought 
Forde’s book.  This proved to be quite a trick for an undergraduate 
at a small rural college, miles from a real bookstore in pre-
Amazon.com days.  It was the very first academic monograph I 
ever purchased.  In that regard, it was a significant marker in my 
life.  When you are buying commentaries on ancient texts with the 
beer money, it likely means that law school is growing less 
attractive and graduate school is in the near future.  I did not know 
what I was getting myself into. 
 
 
3 
 
On the other hand, although I remember reading Forde’s book at 
the time, and I even remember thinking that I enjoyed it, it did not 
provide one of those “Eureka!” moments when the world comes 
into decisively sharper focus.  Whatever insights it implanted in 
my mind were of a narrow sort, so that I remembered the book for 
a good general treatment of how the parts of the Peloponnesian 
War fit together and a useful overview of previous scholarship.  I 
put it away, maybe looked at specific sections a couple of times in 
grad school, and worked on other topics. 
 
 4  But Forde’s book was a totem for me – my first academic  
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monograph – and since I was writing on ancient historians, it was 
still “in my field.”   It survived numerous purges of my collection; 
and as I followed the trail of short-term appointments that are 
ubiquitous in the early careers of my generation of academics, it 
traveled with me from Virginia to Massachusetts, back to Virginia 
and thence to Maine, and back to Virginia again.  I could not say 
for sure that I ever opened it in Maine, but I carried it with me 
there and back again so that it could sit on my shelf as a badge of 
my trade and so that I could have it close at hand should its use be 
called for. 
 
5 
 
In the fall of 2002, Forde’s book burst back into my thought.  This 
essay is a review of sorts.  Like much scholarship, Forde’s book is 
itself akin to a review of previous scholarship as well as the original 
work on which that scholarship is based.  Rediscovering Forde’s 
commentary on Thucydides helped stimulate both a fundamental 
re-thinking of Thucydides and an intense series of personal 
reflections on the meaning that books should hold in my life. I 
encountered a new Thucydides made young and, if not beautiful, 
powerful by the fortuitous intersection of our present 
circumstances, the incredible timelessness of Thucydides’ own 
analysis, and several surprising elements of Forde’s reading that 
appear to resonate more powerfully in our current circumstances 
than they did in those in which they were originally written.  As a 
result, this essay is also about the value of “the great books” and 
scholarly analyses of them.  It reminds us how the incredible 
hubris of writers who declare that they have written “not to meet 
the taste of an immediate public but . . . to last forever” 
(Thucydides I.22) might yet be redeemed. 
 
 
6 
 
My re-reading of Forde nearly coincided with my reading of an 
article by Ruth Grant (2002) on the purpose of political thought.  I 
was impressed by her clarity in arguing that we should not become 
confused about what we are doing in liberal-arts scholarship.  We 
are not simply, or even predominantly, trying to discover new 
knowledge that goes into a great book of wisdom where universal 
and eternal principles are inscribed.  Our best essays share little 
with the write-ups of geneticists who run tests in controlled 
environments and who pronounce definitively that gene X and 
protein Y controls development of Z.  Instead she argues that, by 
engaging in the scholarly study of political theorists, we are 
teaching ourselves to exercise enlightened judgment in the world 
we are given:  assuredly an uncontrolled environment.  We should 
read old, deep, complicated books in light of new conditions 
because they can help us understand our own times from new 
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perspectives that we might otherwise neglect.  In doing so, we 
learn how to judge our problems.  If we do not read the old books, 
we too seldom learn judgment; but if we do not read the 
newspapers, we have nothing to judge. 
 
7 
 
So in the Fall of 2002, I became fascinated by the shifts in 
rhetorical emphasis between Pericles’ famous “Funeral Oration” 
and his less famous, considerably more ominous, final speech.  
Forde’s book was there, on my shelf, waiting to be consulted.  It 
was one of many authorities on Thucydides that I had ready to 
hand; but this time I opened it to discover that, at least for me as 
reader, Forde as commentator, and Thucydides as subject, the 
“Eureka” moment had arrived.  As I read the newspapers in the fall 
of 2002 in the long shadow of the previous September 11, amid 
what seemed to me to be the slow-motion train crash of the run-up 
to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, I was hearing in the political rhetoric 
of Americans echoes of Pericles’ speeches.  It occurred to me that 
that these echoes might suggest some problematic long-term 
consequences for our democratic polity.  I have since committed 
myself to trying to understand what these echoes might indicate 
about our American predicament and trajectory in the world after 
9/11, a world in which neo-conservatives like David Frum and 
Richard Perle are pedaling imperial projects as the way to fulfill 
the promise of an End to Evil. 
 
 
 
 I  
 
8 
 
So why is a reading of Thucydides so important in these days?  We 
must recognize that Thucydides has become a significant and 
contested resource; he has been cited repeatedly over the last sixty 
years to justify significant claims in foreign policy.  It would not be 
an exaggeration to say that, whenever we get a new war, we get a 
new Thucydides. Three different interpretations of Thucydides, 
one historical and two more current, are in play here. 
 
 
9 
 
First, as I and many others have already suggested, the view of the 
Peloponnesian War as a precursor for the Cold War exercised clear 
power for nearly fifty years.  George Marshall first suggested the 
connection in a speech at Princeton University in 1947, and his 
protégé Louis J. Halle published “A Message from Thucydides” in 
the Foreign Service Journal in August 1952.   If the Cold War has 
turned out differently than the Thucydides model might have 
predicted, we might become cautious about asserting new 
historical parallels that bring “Thucydides . . . still closer to us so 
that he now speaks to our ear.”  Yet the urge to call on Thucydides 
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as a guide to new problems remains great.  The famous invitation 
from Thucydides is to think about ways in which “exact knowledge 
of the past” might serve as “an aid to the understanding of the 
future, which in the course of human events must resemble if it 
does not reflect it” (I.22).  Readers of Thucydides’ have proven 
more than willing to oblige.  I should know; I’m one of them. 
 
10 
 
Thus when it was time to justify the aggressive foreign policies that 
followed 9/11, Victor David Hanson and Donald Kagan led the way 
in advancing a second set of interpretations for Thucydides.  
Hanson is widely recognized as one of Vice President Cheney’s 
leading intellectual influences.  He sounded the call in “A Voice 
from the Past:  General Thucydides Speaks about the War,” in the 
National Review Online for November 2001.  In this article, 
Hanson wrenches quotations from Thucydides, sometimes taking 
them desperately out of context, trying to lend credibility to an 
aggressive strategy of attacking all America’s potential enemies to 
forestall future 9/11s.  In this essay and those that followed, 
collected in An Autumn of War and Between War and Peace, 
Hanson claims insistently that Thucydides’ wisdom confirms the 
prescience of the President’s preemptive approach to destroying 
any and all perceived terrorist threats. 
 
 
11 
 
Similarly Daniel Mendelsohn draws attention to the ways that 
Kagan, likely our most eminent Thucydidean historian, has 
fashioned his new one volume history as a revisionist defense of 
the Athenian hawks.  Simply titled The Peloponnesian War, 
Kagan’s book turns Thucydides’ history into an argument for “a 
very twenty-first century project indeed:  a unilateralist policy of 
preemptive war” (2004, p. 82)  Anne Norton puts it bluntly, calling 
Kagan the man “who made Thucydides the architect of American 
empire” (2004, p. 47). 
 
 
12 
 
I want to offer a third reading of Thucydides, as explicitly relevant 
for our times.  I do so hesitantly.  I am less persuaded than Hanson 
and Kagan that we can easily mine historians of the past for 
axioms directly applicable to the present.  We must never lose 
sight of the complexities of Thucydides’ presentation; we must 
never make it trite or formulaic.  Equally, though, we must not 
cede the field to those who would make of his work a simple call to 
aggressive war.  If those who see in Thucydides numerous 
suggestions of current dangers more deep and disturbing than any 
immediately apparent go unchallenged, we can lose the wisdom 
that Thucydides might offer.  We also can lose a powerful tool, 
both theoretical and rhetorical, for reconsidering our present 
 
Joseph H. Lane Jr. 56 Poroi, 4, 2, July, 2005 
position.  I would not be read to say that, just because something 
happened to Athens, it must happen to the U.S.  Instead I would 
pursue a different way to learn from Thucydides.  It comes from 
rediscovering his text and Forde’s commentary on it as they 
interact with my own sense of our current travails.  But let me 
begin by offering a few suggestions about ways in which our 
situation might be closely analogous to that of the Athenians at the 
outset of the Peloponnesian War. 
 
 
 II  
 
13 
 
Today America is increasingly seen as an “imperial” power; and if 
the invasion of Iraq has multiplied these accusations, we must 
admit that it did not initiate them.  Without undertaking a full-
scale content analysis, there is plenty of reason to think that we are 
talking more and more about ourselves as an empire or as a nation 
seen by others as an empire.  Even if we limit ourselves to those 
books published in 2004, examples abound:  Chalmers Johnson’s 
The Sorrows of Empire (2004); Gore Vidal’s Imperial America 
(2004); the classically titled Imperial Hubris by a former CIA 
station chief writing as Anonymous (2004); Alexander Cockburn 
and Jeffrey St. Clair’s Imperial Crusades:  Iraq, Afghanistan, and 
Yugoslavia (2004); John Judis’s The Folly of Empire (2004); 
Niall Ferguson’s Colossus:  The Price of America’s Empire 
(2004).  Even noted conservatives, like George Will of the 
Washington Post, have not flinched from announcing that 
Americans are “doing the business of empire” (May 11, 2004).”   
The list could be much longer, but let this suffice. 
 
 
14 
 
As for the architects of America’s current policy, we have 
conflicting reports.  In both his April 2004 press conference and 
his 2003 State of the Union Address, President Bush maintained 
that “we are not an imperial power” – in the same paragraph 
where he stressed the importance of maintaining U.S. troop levels 
in many foreign countries, including Iraq.  Vice President Cheney’s 
2003 Christmas card featured the telling quotation, “And if a 
sparrow cannot fall to the ground without his notice, is it probable 
that an empire can grow without his aid?” (Kristof 2004).  Deputy 
Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, President Bush’s choice to 
lead the World Bank, is fond of speaking of a Pax Americana, 
strongly suggesting that our age of peace, like the Pax Romana, 
will be the result of imperial pacification. 
 
 
15 
 
As eminent a scholar as Joseph Nye has argued that the U.S. is not 
an empire.  His is a fairly narrow definition, however, and we  
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certainly look like an empire in the Athenian sense.  Our troops are 
quartered in more than 100 countries all over the world.  We 
placed them there in the aftermath of World War II, when we 
completed a war as the most powerful leader of an alliance against 
a totalitarian aggressor, Nazi Germany.  But we were acting to 
protect our allies (and of course ourselves – using others as 
“buffers”) against a new totalitarian threat, our former ally in the 
Soviet Union.  In the traditional Cold War reading of Thucydidean 
analogues, we assumed the role of Athens, Nazi Germany played 
Persia, and the USSR played Sparta. 
 
16 
 
Today we find ourselves still occupying military posts in far-flung 
countries, even though the Soviet Union has collapsed.  Russia 
may be a threat, but seems much less powerful and imminently 
aggressive.  We could now place ourselves in the familiar Athenian 
role, but the Russians ought to be re-considered in the role of the 
Persians.  We, like the Athenians in the 430s, have a tenuous 
control over an alliance or series of alliances:  not just NATO, but 
SEATO, our commitments to the defense of South Korea and 
Japan, our Middle Eastern associations with Israel and certain 
more moderate gulf states, etc.  We maintain these even though 
the threat that necessitated them has now receded.  We should not 
be surprised that some of our allies, who once welcomed us as 
protectors, have come to see us as occupiers.  Like the Athenians, 
we exercise military superiority over nations who once viewed our 
military as the bulwark of their freedom and now view it as an 
impediment to that freedom.  Their interpretations of our military 
commitments, as well as their attitudes towards us, have changed 
accordingly. 
 
 
17 
 
The analogy does not offer a clear antagonist to take the role of 
Sparta, but this fact does not entirely undermine the value of the 
parallel.  We might be in the odd position of having to create a 
Sparta in order to justify our role as Athens.  There is some 
evidence that we are doing so in treating the “forces of worldwide 
terror” as a single, monolithic threat.  It is an illusory monolith 
characterized by its oligarchic, theocratic (Islamic type only), and 
reactionary resistance to American democracy. 
 
 
18 
 
In a major foreign policy speech at the U.S. Air Force Academy in 
June 2004, President Bush painted the “enemy” as fundamentally 
akin to “other totalitarian movements” that “seek to impose a grim 
vision in which dissent is crushed and every man and woman must 
think and live in colorless conformity.”  His efforts to paint this 
picture, similar in tone and imagery to the one we once painted of 
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Soviet communism, serve to suggest that our “enemy” is like a 
nation, even if it is not unified, let alone monolithic.  His 
description of this “nation” is not all that different from 
Thucydides’ description through Pericles of a Spartan regime in 
which each citizen exercises “a jealous surveillance over each 
neighbor.”  As Mark Danner noted on the op-ed page of the New 
York Times, President Bush’s speechwriters started almost 
immediately after September 11 to cast “terrorists” as “the moral 
descendents of Communists, embodiments of evil, who ‘hate our 
freedoms’” (October 9, 2002). 
 
19 
 
On this basis, we can connect our aggressive reaction to the 
terrorism to the hesitance that has begun to mark even our allies, 
the U.K. excluded.  We can discern what we might paraphrase as 
“the growth of the power of the United States, and the alarm which 
this inspired in others.”  The reader of Thucydides can recognize a 
parallel in the widespread suspicion of Athenian power that 
Thucydides took to be the “real cause” of the Peloponnesian War 
(I.24, compare I.88).  We might infer that our terrorist enemies 
and our hesitant friends have similar apprehensions.  It is one 
thing to recognize in celebrations of the Soviet Union’s fall that the 
post-Cold War world would have “only one superpower.”  It is 
another thing altogether to experience the economic, cultural, and 
military predominance by the United States in the resulting world.  
Any nation intent on preserving its identity and its autonomy has 
reason to wonder whether it can be itself in a world so dominated 
by the American presence. 
 
 
20 
 
In this context, we should not be surprised by the extraordinary 
conjunction, on both the left and right, of debates about whether 
that the United States is properly conceived as an “empire.”  
America might be an “empire” of a special character:  specifically a 
“democratic empire,” perhaps even an “empire of liberty.”  
Nonetheless we are widely seen as an “empire.” 
 
 
 
 III  
 
21 
 
The second setting for this reading comes from several articles 
(Hersh 2003; Schlesinger 2004; West 2004; Xenos 2004a) and at 
least two books (Norton 2004; Xenos 2005) that suggest that the 
development of America’s “imperial strategy” has been supervised 
and engineered by Straussians.  The followers of Leo Strauss, the 
German-born teacher of political philosophy who taught at the 
New School, University of Chicago, and St. John’s College from the 
1940s until his death in 1973, were once the topic of discussion 
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only in the academy.  Today they are regularly the topic of popular 
publications, and the idea that Straussians in the administration 
master-mind current policy is now cited as accepted wisdom. 
 
22 
 
As a student of political theory who was educated in the Straussian 
tradition and whose thinking about recent events stems from re-
reading Thucydides, I can add that connecting current issues 
about imperial strategy to intellectual considerations associated 
with Strauss re-confirms a sense that Thucydides is important for 
us now.  Long before the Strauss connections to Shulsky, Perle, 
Wolfowitz, and Krystal gave birth to talk of a special (and 
insidious) association between his teachings and the politics of 
American empire, Straussians routinely treated Thucydides’ 
Peloponnesian War as the account of “empire.”  They have written 
about Thucydides’ account of Athens as an analysis of “democratic 
empire” or, to use a Straussian formulation, “the empire problem  
par excellence.”  If Straussians are authors and architects of 
current foreign policy and concomitant domestic deceptions, we 
have special reason to consider anew the “Straussian teaching” 
about empire. This teaching can be found, as much as anywhere, in 
Straussian commentaries on Thucydides. 
 
 
23 
 
Straussian discussions of Thucydides turn out to relate directly to 
current contexts because they focus largely on whether or how 
seizing and holding an “empire” may be justified.  Clifford Orwin 
takes this approach in The Humanity of Thucydides (1994).  There 
the question he considers “above all” is “To what extent is the 
empire to be understood as a project freely undertaken and 
sustained, and to what extent as a burden that Athens had had no 
choice but to shoulder and to continue to bear?” (p. 29).  As James 
Boyd White asks, “Was Athens compelled by circumstances to talk 
as she did . . . , or could she have talked in other, less destructive 
ways?” (1984, pp. 85-86). 
 
 
24 
 
Orwin argues that such questions have both theoretical and 
practical importance.  The theoretical issue is fundamental for 
understanding the theoretic essence of political life:  Was 
Machiavelli correct to argue that the rule of force is the only rule 
that matters for politics?  Yet the narrative by Thucydides never 
loses sight of practical implications.  Ever the political historian, 
he was acutely aware of tensions like those that the war on 
terrorism brings forcefully to our attention:  Are democracies 
devoted to freedom ideologically incapable of such imperial 
requirements as the willingness to exercise domination?  
Straussian commentaries on Thucydides refer insistently to 
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tensions between “freedom and empire” as “the theme of political 
history” (Strauss 1989, p. 73; Bruell 1974a, p. 11; Forde 1989, pp. 
41-42). 
 
25 
 
Freedom and empire:  we say these two words together time and 
again because they are strange antonyms in a strict way but 
potential synonyms in a looser sense.  They appear as antonyms in 
George Will’s reference to the events at Abu Ghraib:  “But empire 
is always about domination.  Domination for self-defense, 
perhaps.  Domination for the good of the dominated, arguably.  
But domination” (2004).  As Forde reminds us, however, “freedom 
for some” can consist of “rule over others” (1989, p. 42).  Thus to 
treat expansion of freedom as coeval with domination of the Other 
is to make them synonyms.  Are these flip sides of the same coin? 
 
 
26 
 
The brutal irony of the idea that we could (and might have to) erect 
an “empire of liberty” is the irony that Thucydides displayed at the 
heart of the Athenian dilemma.  An illustration for the Harper’s 
article by Thomas de Zengotita’s on “The Romance of Empire and 
the Politics of Self-Love” (2003, p. 34) captures this irony for us in 
an anti-war cartoon that shows an American soldier aiming a 
machine gun at a petrified Arab while demanding:  “fe - ree - dom, 
say it!!”  It was easy to foresee that the invasion of Iraq would lead 
to such ironies; this cartoon appeared nine months before similar 
images associated with the Abu Ghraib prison-abuse scandals grew 
to dominate discourse about the Iraq War.  We do well to specify 
tensions between our democratic ideals of freedom and the 
disciplines of domination that characterize “the business of 
empire.”  Otherwise we slip into choices without recognizing them. 
 
 
27 
 
There are deeper, rhetorical levels to the problem.  Political 
theorists need to specify and confirm how the Machiavellian view 
of the world as an endless struggle for power might hold, and thus 
learn to how the requirements of empire might be necessary for 
“free” nations to learn   if they are to survive.  Beyond this 
theoretical question, statesmen who accept such views face 
rhetorical challenges:  How can they persuade people who might 
not share a Machiavellian view of the world to take actions 
required to protect themselves in precarious environments?  
Athenians and Americans alike must be persuaded that the 
dangerous “business of empire” is for them. Democracies may be 
hesitant to adopt imperial projects, especially when it calls for 
citizens to fight and die.  As Lewis Lapham writes, “Americans are 
an authentically civilian people, devoid of an exalted theory of the 
state that might allow us to govern subject races with a firm hand 
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and a quiet conscience.  The imperial project [may serve] the 
interests of the propertied classes, but the work must be 
performed by the laboring classes, and it is never easy to harness 
the energy of the latter to the enthusiasms of the former” (2004 p. 
10).  Lapham concludes that politicians must tell Americans lies, 
and he is certainly correct that it requires telling them something.  
But what rhetoric does it require? 
 
28 
 
Again there is reason to think that Thucydides might help us 
understand our own position and our own possibilities better than 
other thinkers, even more current ones.  He is the historian who 
most carefully integrates rhetoric into his account of the tension 
between “freedom and empire.”  He constructs speeches and 
places them in the mouths of major actors in the business of the 
Peloponnesian War.  He makes them “say what was in [his] 
opinion demanded of them by the various occasions, of course 
adhering as closely as possible to the general sense of what was 
really said” (1.22.1). 
 
 
29 
 
These speeches form the backbone of the History, even though 
Thucydides insisted that the war’s “real cause,” the widespread 
fear of Athenian power, was the one “least spoken.”  His interest in 
“causes of action” extends to knowing in a way that is “more 
complicated and more useful than a simple statement of Spartan 
apprehensions” (White 1984, p. 60).  Yet if the “real cause” was not 
spoken, others must have been cited rhetorically, and those are 
important too.  Had they no rhetorical power, the war might have 
happened differently or not at all.  The phrase is well worn but 
apt:  Thucydides knew the capacity for rhetoric to “take on a life of 
its own.”  This living rhetoric exhibits a number of themes that are 
shared by the Athenians in Thucydides’ time and the Americans in 
ours.  The similarities are striking. 
 
 
30 
 
Orwin’s question signals the two rhetorics in Thucydides for 
justifying the Athenian empire, and they express two theories of 
empire.  One argues that the empire is necessary for security, 
compelling Athenians to defend it.  The other argues that the 
empire is a “freely chosen Athenian project,” representing 
Athenian decisions for good or ill that we can judge as unjust or 
imprudent.  The outcome of the History suggests that any 
Athenian choices of empire prove open to weighty objections. 
 
 
31 
 
The Straussian commentaries on Thucydides provide careful 
discussions of the speeches for positions taken in the History, 
especially speeches that treat empire as necessary for Athenian  
Joseph H. Lane Jr. 62 Poroi, 4, 2, July, 2005 
survival by contrast with speeches that portray Athenian empire as 
a “freely chosen project.”  The text and the commentaries help 
analyze the impact of older speeches that resemble current ones.  
The analysis can take advantage of our emotions being less 
inflamed by the older speeches even as we know more about their 
outcomes.  As a Straussian reflection, Forde’s book (1989) is a 
close cousin to Orwin’s The Humanity of Thucydides (1994) and 
Bruell’s “Thucydides’ View of Athenian Imperialism” (1974a).  All 
are progeny of Strauss’s own accounts of Thucydides in The City 
and Man (1978) and “Thucydides: The Meaning of Political 
History” (1989). 
 
32 
 
The next two sections explore the two explicit explanations of the 
Athenian empire offered by Athenians in speeches that Thucydides 
composed for the History.  I use these discussions to trace echoes 
in current American rhetoric.1  The differences between the 
originals and the echoes are important, and I do not want to lose 
sight of them.  Yet the telling commonalities reinforce the 
suggestion that the United States might be caught in an imperial 
trap.  The History’s account the character and contours of this trap 
are what I take to make it so clarifying for America’s current 
situation.  What should Americans now guard against in imperial 
power and the two rhetorics that would justify it for a democracy?  
The History offers no blueprint for action by the United States or 
prediction of its futures.  But it does help identify troubles with the 
recurrent rhetorics advanced so far to support an imperial policy 
of preemptive war. 
 
 
 
 IV  
 
33 
 
The History’s most famous speech is the “Funeral Oration” by 
Pericles.  Offered in honor of “the first Athenians to fall” in the 
Peloponnesian War, it reveals the thinking by Athenians about 
their place in the world at the war’s outset.  Forde’s account treats 
this speech as a justification for an imperial policy, and his reading 
of the long-term influence that it had on the Athenians ought to be 
sobering for us.  Alert readers of Thucydides might object that 
Pericles was arguing for Athenian restraint in not seeking new 
foreign conquests.  Yet Thucydides’ Pericles explicitly praised 
restraint as the best method to preserve Athens’ empire in the 
short term and to expand it in the long term.  Forde insists that the 
Funeral Oration argument is prudent but nevertheless imperial.  
He holds that the Funeral Oration and the final speech by Pericles 
provide crucial openings to Thucydides’ account of the trajectories 
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that define Athenian politics.  In these speeches, Thucydides 
reveals the “logic of empire” in Athenian public discourse and the 
connections between this logic and the eventual collapse of 
Athenian political life. 
 
34 
 
Insofar as we Americans are in the early stages of what leaders say 
is a long-term war to defend of an imperial position, a war that 
may require extending our reach to defend what we have, we are in 
a position somewhat analogous to that of ancient Athens.  No 
doubt there are some important differences.  But if we are living 
the logic that Forde identifies in the early speeches of Pericles, and 
if Forde is right that this logic led the Athenians to defeat, we do 
well to recognize sooner rather than later the dangerous position 
that we share with the Athenians. 
 
 
35 
 
Among the Straussian commentators on Thucydides, Forde and 
Orwin, in particular, read the Peloponnesian War with American 
concerns in mind.  Both stress the internal corruption that empire 
can work on democracy.  Forde demonstrates how imperial 
rhetoric prepares Athenian culture for the rise of Alcibiades, the 
reckless political and military genius who dominated and betrayed 
Athens in the last ten years of the Peloponnesian War.  As much as 
it may be said that Straussians are infatuated with Alcibiades, it is 
much harder to argue that they approve of him or the political 
developments that produce such characters.  At times, Forde 
seems to argue that the Athenians might have prevailed in Sicily if 
they had not alienated Alcibiabes, but this need not mean that 
Athens would have been better as a result or that such a victory 
would have been good for the Athenian regime.  Forde focuses on 
Alcibiades as the most conspicuous example and symbol of the 
corruption that empire inflicts on Athens.  According to Forde, 
Thucydides wanted readers to recognize Alcibiades as a symptom 
of the dangers in empire.  Forde emphasizes the incompatibility of 
Alcibiades with a healthy regime in Athens.  So does Orwin, who 
portrays the imperialism of Athens as “partially analogous to the 
plague” and “fever” of which Thucydides would “cure” political 
people (1994, p. 205). 
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The roots of our recent interventionist foreign policy, which many 
have been willing, and with good cause, to label “imperial,” extend 
to the earliest impulses of America’s engagement in the world.  But 
the issues raised by American imperialism has been placed in 
particularly sharp relief by the invasion of Iraq and suggestions by 
the Bush administration that this is only one in a series of actions 
for a larger “war on terrorism.”  The ebb and flow of imperial wars 
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challenge democratic leaders to take different rhetorical tacks, 
moving between the two different explanations of empire to justify 
their interventions.  The relationship can become a contrapuntal 
dance where political leaders draw first on one argument then on 
the other.  The shifts might meet political exigencies in the short 
term, yet they also might introduce dissonances that undermine 
specific policies or even entire democracies in the longer run. 
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John Kerry’s 1971 testimony toward the end of the Vietnam War 
asked what justification could be given to its “last man to die.”  The 
time was late, the tone was plaintive, and any answer would be 
defensive.  The positive case for democratic empire seems more 
suited to beginning a war.  Thus, today, it is peculiarly appropriate 
that we look to the speech that Thucydides places in the mouth of 
his Pericles toward the start of the Peloponnesian War; and a 
leading candidate for the locus classicus of Bush’s positive and 
programmatic appeal for democratic empire is the speech on 
November 6, 2003 to the National Endowment for Democracy 
(NED).  A prominent supporter of the President’s foreign policy, 
William Safire has said that this is the address that best clarifies 
the policy’s gravity and promise.  Safire’s column in the New York 
Times on November 10, 2003, calls for readers to examine the 
speech’s structure and design.  After cautioning against the 
distorted accounts of “summarizers,” Safire presents the address 
as a “detailed, coherent, and inspiring” explanation to rally 
Americans to “our mission.”2 
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Bush’s NED speech is an account of American greatness, just as 
the Funeral Oration by Thucydides for Pericles is an account of 
Athenian greatness.  To be sure, there are differences of note.  
Many relate to contrasts in setting and form.  As a public eulogy 
for those fallen in war, the Pericles speech directly addresses 
questions of sacrifice.  President Bush has yet to deliver a major 
speech on such an occasion; nor has he been willing to talk much, 
let alone directly, about American war deaths, particularly in Iraq.  
His public statements make vague references to the sacrifices of 
our military personnel, sometimes conflating the inconvenience of 
time away from home with the loss of loved ones killed.  America’s 
closest analog to a military funeral address might be the 
President’s Memorial Day appearance at Arlington National 
Cemetery.  On that occasion, Bush has told brief anecdotes about 
soldiers killed in Iraq, but he has added little to justify their dying.  
In the NED speech, he twice insists, without elaboration, 
“Freedom is worth fighting for, dying for, and standing for.”  Such 
words are as close as he comes to direct justifications for American 
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deaths in current wars.  Still there are striking similarities between 
the Bush speech to the NED and the Pericles Funeral Oration in 
construction, imagery, argument, and purpose. 
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The two speeches share key features of structure.  Both open with 
arguments that the Athenian or American people are contributing 
forms of government that enhance the world. Thucydides’ Pericles 
celebrates “the form of government under which our greatness 
grew.”  He connected that “form” to the character of “our 
greatness.”  Then he explained how that greatness gets transmitted 
from his country to others.  Pericles famously praised Athens as 
“the school of Hellas,” capable of producing the greatest human 
individuals and “alone of her contemporaries . . . greater than her 
reputation.”  He insisted that the great power of Athens and the 
monuments erected to that power guarantee “the admiration of 
the present and succeeding ages” (2.41.1-4). 
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President Bush advances the broader thesis that the United States 
is the “school of the world.”  In doing so, he passes judgment on 
the pretensions of “sophisticated Europeans” who could not 
recognize in Ronald Reagan’s anti-communism of the 1980s the 
emergence of a new world order.  By implication, they would be 
wrong to resist the change that his United States is now 
introducing.  Even before this speech, Mark Danner (2002) heard 
in the Bush rhetoric a “comprehensive, prophetic, evangelical” 
mission that would animate the American people to pursue 
“freedom’s triumph over all its age-old foes.”  Echoing Pericles in 
the Funeral Oration, Bush would rally us to “realize the power” of 
America and to “feed [our] eyes upon her from day to day, till love 
of her fills [our] hearts,” thus animating the conviction needed to 
pursue the “historic opportunity to change the world.” 
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Like Pericles, Bush argues that the relationship between “form” 
and “greatness” resides in our ability to generate effective 
commitment to the “public good” by allowing citizens to pursue 
“their own good” as they see it.  In his NED speech, he champions 
the American system as one where “[f]reedom honors and 
unleashes human creativity,” allowing Americans to pursue their 
own ends and allowing their “willingness to sacrifice” to develop 
naturally rather than as the result of what Pericles called the 
“painful discipline” of the foe.  Bush’s claims about America echo 
those found in Forde’s gloss of the Periclean praise of Athens:  “the 
Athenian regime, based on this unprecedented liberalism, this 
liberation of human faculties repressed or restricted under the 
conditions of ordinary political life, has discovered a source of 
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power broader and more explosive than that available to any other 
city known to their political experience” (1989, p. 38).  As 
Thucydides had Pericles say of the Athenians, Bush holds that 
Americans are powerful precisely because we are free.  The full 
expression of this freedom will result in the greatest power, unlike 
any the world has seen before. 
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To advance democracy, says President Bush, Americans act 
without the compulsion or religious delusion, without any 
“ideology of theocratic terror,” like that which characterizes the 
“capricious and corrupt” elites who force people to fight for enemy 
regimes.  Like Soviet communism, today’s religious tyrannies will 
fail precisely because they do not respect their “own people, their 
creativity, their genius and their rights.”  Building on this contrast 
with enemy forces as oppressed and conscripted, Bush maintains 
that voluntarism, like liberty in the Athenian account, makes 
American sacrifices especially remarkable because our citizens 
have so much to lose. 
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After proceeding in parallel with the Funeral Oration throughout 
much of the body, the NED speech turn away near its peroration.  
The President’s account seems less nationalistic and more 
idealistic, even ideological.3  Pericles appeals to his fellow citizens 
to fill their hearts with the love of “the power of Athens” and “the 
imperishable monuments” that Athens has erected as “mighty 
proofs” of that power.  Even if this power of Athens could have 
some transcendent or universal appeal, Pericles sells it as 
peculiarly Athenian.  If democracy is exportable, Pericles 
celebrates the claims of Athens to being its author, its greatest 
prophet and its foremost symbol. 
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Thus Forde focuses on what he sees as Pericles’ self-conscious 
eroticizing of Athens’ politics.  He argues that it is the “liberated 
erotic passion” of the Athenians, marked by Pericles’ erotic 
language, that commits the Athenians to these politics.  He claims 
that “Thucydides’ presentation of the sequence of events that set 
all this in motion carries a strong impression of inevitability; that 
is an impression that a democracy characterized by such liberation 
of human faculties must inevitably become imperialistic” (1989, p. 
38).  Forde’s subsequent account of Athenian military moves 
foregrounds this erotic commitment.  It is what makes the rhetoric 
of “liberty” resonate with the Athenians:  “the first and perhaps the 
primary attachment of eros in Athens is the attachment to freedom 
itself.  That is to say, in the Athenian case at least, eros comes close 
to revealing itself as a pure and promiscuous desire for freedom as 
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such” (p. 39). 
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By comparison, the American invocation of freedom may seem 
more noble, more generous, and less dangerous.  President Bush 
appears to be less parochial in his offer to the world.  As Safire says 
with emphasis, “America has put our power at the service of 
principle.”  Bush’s praise of “freedom” as the keystone of “every 
successful society,” “the design of nature,” and “the direction of 
history” suggests that all can participate equally in its blessings.  
He offers a share of its glorious realization to all as “the right and 
capacity of all mankind.” 
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We should not be too eager, however, to think that America avoids 
the narcissism of Athens in this positive statement of the case for 
imperial democracy.  President Bush is quick to point out, “It is no 
accident that the rise of so many democracies took place in a time 
when the world’s leading nation was itself a democracy.”  “United 
States commitments” are central to the story; and while “the 
spread of freedom can be hard,” “America has accomplished hard 
tasks before.”  The Bush speech leaves no doubt who leads the 
march of this universal ideal and to whom the greatest glory will 
be due when victory is secure. 
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The American account never faces the conflict in its call for a 
general triumph of freedom and its suggestion of continuing 
leadership by America.  Is this a defect?  Have we utterly neglected 
the conceptual and practical difficulties inherent in joining 
“freedom and empire,” the very difficulties that Thucydides seems 
so intent upon exploring?  “There is,” Forde writes, “the sense in 
which rule or dominion over others is itself the greatest form of 
freedom – a fact we are not accustomed to acknowledging but 
which the Athenians seemed to relish. . . .  The democratic love 
and defense of freedom at Athens could have passed insensibly 
into the impulse to rule over others by a transformation more 
natural than we generally suppose” (pp. 39-40).  Thucydides’ 
Pericles recognizes this tension and faces it self-consciously, while 
we tend to overlook it.  There can be little doubt that, whenever 
President Bush praises “freedom,” he refers first and foremost to 
American freedom and that, whenever American freedom collides 
with others, it is preferred.  Our “love and defense of freedom” can 
pass “insensibly into the impulse to rule over others.”  Events at 
Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo suggest that this is already 
happening. 
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freedom that transcends any rogue or misguided actions of 
particular MP’s.  The Periclean appeal explicitly elevates 
Athenians’ claims to freedom over others, and the Bush speech 
implies confidence that Americans possess a special character that 
may justify a similar preferential status.  I doubt that any broadly 
preemptive foreign policy can be sustained without such a 
parochial premise.  There is little sense in dying for freedom that 
remains wholly abstract, with no tie to other goods that we can call 
“our own”; and there is little reason for individuals to die only for 
their personal, individual freedom, since death ends personality 
and freedom.  What remains is the ideal of dying for freedom as 
part of a higher, encompassing cause that includes others as well 
as oneself.  The patriotic call is to die for a country that enjoys its 
distinctive freedom even after the personal sacrifice of its 
successful defenders. 
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Arriving in Baghdad for what turned out to be brief service as the 
head of Iraqi reconstruction, Lt. General Jay Garner emphasized 
the special boldness produced by a sense of patriotic purpose.  To 
the troops, he said, “You ought to be beating your chest every 
morning.  You ought to look in the mirror, suck in our bellies, and 
say, ‘Damn, we’re Americans!’” (de Zengotita 2003, p. 31).  Not 
every appeal to patriotism is tainted with “supremacist” 
sentiments, but many commentators have noted in talk of the 
Bush administration what Stanley Hoffman has called the “new 
exceptionalism” (2004).  To sustain public support for wars likely 
to be long-term where immediate physical survival of the country 
is not obviously at risk, public appeals must take on a particularly 
powerful, even hyperbolic, intensity.  We might blush or recoil at 
the openly parochial eros in the Funeral Oration; yet we should 
recognize how we are drawn toward similar appeals, even when we 
think that the promise of “freedom” can be perfectly inclusive. 
 
 
 
 V  
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It is often noted that the sense of optimism and purpose in the 
Funeral Oration sets up readers for a stunning reversal.  Sara 
Monoson and Michael Loriaux explain how this shift in emphasis 
should temper our enthusiasm for the patriotic call of Pericles.  
They show how the “antithesis” construction of Thucydides’s text 
mimics for readers the terrible disorientation suffered by 
Athenians who have their “expectations nurtured at one point” and 
“dashed” the next (1998, pp. 287, ff.).  Thucydides followed the 
Pericles call for public-spirited action with the dual tragedy of 
 
Joseph H. Lane Jr. 69 Poroi, 4, 2, July, 2005 
Sparta invading Athens while plague assaulted the Athenians 
trapped within their city walls. 
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The Funeral Oration urged Athenians to engage in the most 
selfless patriotic behavior, but the sense of doom that followed 
military retreat and death from disease made the Athenians 
preternaturally insecure and self-absorbed.  Any sense of public 
spiritedness is likely to be short-lived among individuals under the 
threat of imminent death.  In a democracy, widespread pessimism 
(whether caused by foreign-policy failure, economic downturn, or 
even natural disaster) can disarm political commitments.  The 
NED speech came near the end of a long period of confidence, 
shortly before excitement surrounding the capture of Saddam 
Hussein marked one of the last major upswings in optimism about 
the war in Iraq.  Since late 2003, public opinion on the war has 
moved mostly downward.  If Americans have not experienced the 
stunning reversal, the utter collapse, that struck the Athenians in 
the summer of 430, the possibility of such a turn lurks in only one 
terrorist attack on American soil or a truly terrible defeat in Iraq:  
An attack that took massive casualties, something akin to the 
Beiruit bombing of Marine barracks in 1983, could easily turn 
lurking unease about the occupation into widespread public 
outrage and hostility. 
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Vulnerability to such abrupt shifts is an enduring trouble for any 
democracy that would maintain an imperial policy.  As Danner and 
others observed even before the invasion of Iraq, shifting “moods” 
of public opinion can keep democracies from sustaining the long-
term commitments to foreign enterprises that an imperial, 
preemptive policy requires.  Between March 2003 and July 2004, 
CNN-Gallup polls showed that the percentage of Americans who 
thought that going to war in Iraq was a mistake increased by 27%.  
CBS- New York Times polls for the same period have Americans 
who approve the war’s conduct dropping by 17%.  The percentages 
who thought that the U.S. was doing “very well” or “somewhat 
well” in Iraq fell from 72% in May 2003 to 43% in July 2004.  
From the beginning of 2003 to the middle of 2004, at least one in 
three Americans surveyed changed their minds at least once about 
Iraq.  Such fluctuations are not surprising.  Thucydides knew to 
expect them for Athens; pollsters know to expect them for 
America.  However, the former recognized that these swings in 
public confidence made imperial policies nearly unsustainable 
over the long-term.  It is not at all clear that our leaders recognize 
the dangers that they pose on our current course. 
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Thucydides traces how fluctuating confidence made it increasingly 
difficult for Athenian leaders to maintain their policy of 
preemptive imperialism.  He shows how hawkish leaders anxious 
to play offensive strategy to the hilt were driven to ever more 
extravagant rhetoric in trying to hold citizens on course.  Yet their 
hyperbolic efforts to construct stable grounds for agreement on 
empire proved futile, and, in the readings of Forde, White, Orwin, 
and others, it is this collapse of public agreement that ultimately 
undermined the very basis of Athenian democracy. 
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Even the relatively moderate rhetoric of Pericles contributed to 
setting the stage for the later reversals suffered by Athens.  So even 
it had to go.  Hardships created by the plague and the Spartan 
invasion fed doubt about Pericles’ policies, and these pushed him 
toward a different account of Athenian empire.  His final defense 
need not clash with the Funeral Oration; it even echoes the earlier 
account at times, but the real tensions between Thucydides’ 
Pericles’ two justifications of empire are vitally important for us to 
understand.  Just as promises from the Funeral Oration resound in 
Bush’s NED talk, aspects of Pericles’ negative rhetoric for empire 
have begun to appear in Bush’s speeches on America’s role in the 
world. 
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When Athenians seemed least inclined to imperial policy, 
Thucydides presents Pericles as employing a rhetoric of fear.  It 
stresses the costs of abandoning empire.  In pointing to the 
dangers that Athenians face, though, it also speaks openly for the 
first time about the magnitude of Athenian power (Forde 1989, pp. 
54-55).  In his last speech, Pericles argued that Athenians have 
never before appreciated the great extent of their powers, 
especially their naval power (2.62.2).  Thus this speech combined a 
new, more forceful, even boastful, declaration of Athenian 
invincibility with a new, more negative, specifically frightening 
account of risks run by Athenians if they fail to contribute fully to 
the public good:  for then they cannot make full use of their powers 
in the face of grave dangers. 
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Elements of this odd juxtaposition have re-surfaced in some 
speeches by President Bush.  At Northern Michigan University in 
June 2004, the President claimed that “America’s future also 
depends on our willingness to lead in the world.  The momentum 
of freedom in our time is strong, but we still face serious dangers.  
Al Qaeda is wounded, but not broken.  Terrorists continue to 
attack in Afghanistan and Iraq; regimes in North Korea and Iran 
are challenging the peace.  If America shows weakness or 
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uncertainty in this decade, the world will drift toward tragedy.”  
This speech says at least eight different ways that “America is 
safer” as a result of the current, preemptive policy; and yet it says 
in at least six different ways that America faces awful, imminent 
dangers.  “In a country as big as ours, there’s no such thing as 
perfect security, and threats to our homeland are real.  We know 
the terrorists want to strike the United States again, to spread fear 
and disrupt our way of life.”  The specter of fear has been even 
more prominent in other forums, including the ominous 
voiceovers for 2004 campaign commercials.  These predict death 
and destruction, and one features the President’s most frightening 
line from the State of the Union address in 2002:  “It would take 
one vial, one canister, one crate slipped into this country to bring a 
day of horror like none we have ever known.” 
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Critics of Bush policy have said repeatedly that fear-mongering has 
become its main defense.  Announcements of terror alerts, leaks of 
foreboding intelligence, and reports on the whereabouts of 
terrorists all contribute to a rhetorical strategy that Maureen Dowd 
(2003) characterizes as “scaring up votes.”  Sheldon Wolin (2003) 
characterizes each of these tactics as contributing to the 
“generalized fear” that Hannah Arendt declared the operative 
principle of totalitarianism.  Anne Norton (2004, pp. 157-159) 
builds on Wolin’s analysis to argue that Americans have become 
increasingly trapped by an “unendurable fear.”  The formulation is 
plausible, but a more complex rhetoric may feed the war on 
terrorism:  one apparent in Thucydides’ Pericles’ final efforts to tie 
Athenians to his imperial policies.  The language of fear and 
danger does intensify in Bush speeches as public support for 
imperial policies becomes less stable.  Like Pericles, however, Bush 
tempers his expressions of fear and difficulty with a confident 
emphasis on American strength and a conviction of ultimate 
victory. 
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The trouble is that this shifts the foundation for action from 
freedom and democracy to power.  In the first Pericles address, 
Forde argues, there is a paradoxical restraint on the most 
imperialist impulses.  It comes from framing the call for Athenian 
action in terms of the polity’s special character and historic 
mission.  When horizons were bright and the “positive” argument 
for empire suited Athenian moods, the polity’s special mission 
could animate Athenians.  When difficulties shook their 
confidence and the “negative” argument fit the times, the special 
mission of Athens turns into its special power.  To communicate 
the situation’s gravity, Pericles stressed its awful dangers.  But to 
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prevent Athenians from becoming dispirited and resigned to 
failure, he invoked the polity’s power as the real basis for its firm 
prospects for success.  Even when successful, this rhetoric 
unfortunately tended to replace the earlier sense that Athens was a 
world leader because of its politics with the starker suggestion that 
Athens was a world leader because of its power. 
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The President’s campaign rhetoric in 2004 mimicked the final 
speech of Pericles in juxtaposing images of weakness and 
strength.  It also followed the Pericles strategy of absorbing 
opponents and doubters into an amorphous form of collective 
responsibility.  “If I voted for war,” said Pericles, “I only did as you 
did yourselves” (2.64.1).  Likewise a leading line in the 2004 stump 
speech reminded audiences that both Senator Kerry and Senator 
Edwards had voted for the resolution authorizing force in Iraq (see 
Balz 2004).  Bush campaign spots included clips of Kerry 
statements stripped of context to suggest that he earlier gave 
blanket endorsements to the President’s war in Iraq. 
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The Bush rhetoric included an insistence that Americans have had 
no choice because the enemy would have attacked in any event “if 
[we] refused to comply with his demands.”  It also features a 
variation on the broad insistence of Pericles that vacillation 
represents the weakness of those who are unable or unwilling to 
“stay the course”: “the apparent error of my policy lies in the 
infirmity of your resolution, since the suffering that it entails is 
being felt by everyone among you, while its advantage is still 
remote. . . .  your mind is too much depressed to persevere in your 
resolves” (2.61.2). 
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The difficulties in keeping these elements side by side surfaced 
briefly when, on the eve of the Republican National Convention, 
the President made his infamous statement that “we cannot win 
the war on terror.”  His spokespersons were anxious to “walk back” 
the President’s comment, insisting that he misspoke, that he only 
meant there would be no peace treaty to end the war, that he was 
merely recognizing the obvious truth that there would be no “VT 
Day.”  But the remark revealed one of the problems with this 
rhetoric that we can see clearly in Thucydides’ account of its 
consequences as well as more dimly, yet unmistakably, in our own 
recent experience.  Mobilizing America demands fear-mongering 
but requires avoiding any doubt about America’s eventual success, 
because a relentless sense of danger could induce despair.  
America must be imminently endangered but preeminently 
strong.  There must always be light at the end of the tunnel, 
 
Joseph H. Lane Jr. 73 Poroi, 4, 2, July, 2005 
however long.  Bush forgot that for an unscripted moment.  And 
yet if the situation is dire and still the outcome, provided that we 
stay the course, is inevitable, this rhetoric inevitably casts domestic 
opponents to the reigning imperialist policy as the real enemies of 
the state.  We are led to believe that al Qaeda could never defeat us 
unless the president’s domestic opponents get to make policy.  
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Thucydides’ Pericles is far more aware of the tensions in his 
rhetoric than President Bush appears to be.  The current 
administration is guilty of ignoring the real costs, both financial 
and rhetorical, that we are paying to maintain the war on 
terrorism.  Still conflicts over the long-term compatibility of 
democracy and empire will have consequences, even if they stay 
submerged or receive less explicit attention in America.  The 
negative argument of Pericles makes the main perplexity 
unmistakable:  “Besides, to recede is no longer possible, if indeed 
any of you in the alarm of the moment has become enamored of 
the honesty of such an unambitious part.  For what you hold is, to 
speak somewhat plainly, a tyranny.  To take it perhaps was wrong, 
but to let it go is unsafe” (2.63.2).  The logic is chilling.  The 
empire’s strength is so great that only (democratic?) unwillingness 
to use it can defeat the empire, yet disaster is imminent because 
willingness to use the full powers of empire enrages a wide range 
of potential opponents, and any sign of weakness, even domestic, 
political disagreements, will encourage them to strike. 
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Thucydides had Pericles admit what we will not:  that vigorous 
exercise of a preemptive, imperial policy continually raises the 
stakes for abandoning that policy.  Most supporters of the policy, 
like President Bush, insist that there is no tie between our actions 
in support of the policy and the escalating risks that we run.  
During a Rose Garden press conference on August 4, 2004, in 
response to “suggestions” that the administration’s actions have 
been “responsible for fueling the recruitment of al Qaeda,” 
President Bush responded that any such claim is a “fundamental 
misunderstanding of the war on terror.”  He concluded by insisting 
that “the best way to protect the American homeland is to stay on 
the offense.  It is a ridiculous notion to assert that, because the 
United States is on the offense, more people want to hurt us.  
We’re on the offense because people want to hurt us.”  Pericles’ 
defense of Athens’ imperial policy tacitly admits that the notion is 
not ridiculous, but Bush has insistently repeated not only that “an 
aggressive” policy is the only tenable answer to the malice that 
some harbor but also that this policy does not increase the amount 
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or the intensity of that malice. 
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Some people would want to attack the United States regardless of 
its policies.  Some are, as President Bush claims, “cold-blooded, 
committed killers” who are “interested in destroying our way of 
life.”  Others have been moved by its policies to oppose the United 
States.  White (1984, pp. 77-78) says that the Athenians are 
completely unrealistic, even in their most “realist” exchanges, 
when they refuse to take seriously the Melian insistence that 
Athenians should assess how their actions affect the views that 
others have of them.  Bush’s dismissive response to much the same 
suggestion implies that today’s American policies may be 
dangerously naïve and short-sighted.  Forde maintains that the 
Athenians eventually find themselves trapped in their imperial 
policy, unable to sustain it or to let it go.  Failing even to see the 
imperial trap for democracies seems a real possibility for us, given 
the optimism of Bush rhetoric, and it might intensify our dangers. 
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We can see these problems emerging in the persistent American 
confusion in the face of foreign resistance to our plans.  We seem 
at a loss when confronted by others who are not immediately 
persuaded by the stories we tell ourselves.  We should pay careful 
attention to those places in the Peloponnesian War in which 
Thucydides shows Athenians following the domestic example of 
Pericles to justify their empire for foreign audiences on grounds of 
fear.  The usual results were unhappy (Forde 1989, pp. 61ff.). 
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The first Athenian visit to Sicily during the Peloponnesian War 
came at the invitation of Camarina, who wanted Athens to oppose 
Syracuse.  But when Athenians came back in 415, they faced an 
unexpected debate with the Syracusans to win support from 
Camarina.  In this debate, the aptly named Euphemus defended 
the Athenian return by explaining that “our empire, and of the 
good right we have to it” must fear domination if it does not “order 
matters” to provide for its safety (6.82).  He said that “fear makes 
us hold our empire in Hellas, and fear makes us come . . . not to 
enslave any but rather to prevent any from being enslaved” (6.83).  
Since Camarinans had warred against Syracuse in the past, 
Euphemus held that they should not distrust the Athenians, who 
would renew that war (6.86).   He even said that all Athenian 
dominion based itself entirely on self-defense:  “we are rulers in 
Hellas in order not to be subjects; liberators in Sicily that we may 
not be harmed by the Sicilians . . . .  we are compelled to interfere 
in many things, because we have many things to guard against” 
(6.87).  This amoral vindication spurred Camarinans to fear that 
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the Athenians would subjugate Sicily.  In spite of earlier sympathy 
with the Athenians, once they had heard Euphemus explain the 
grounds of Athenian action in terms that might be well-suited to 
marshalling domestic support for a war in Sicily but that could not 
persuade Sicilians that Athens was not coming to stay, the 
Camarinans decided to play both sides, offering help to Syracuse 
as well as Athens (6.88). 
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As in the infamous speeches at Melos, the subtle juxtaposition by 
Pericles of fears about exposure with claims to power lapses into a 
blunt rhetoric of “destroy with us or be destroyed by us.”  Such 
blunt statements mark the hubris that corrupted Athens.  It 
reveals how the early, restrained, seemingly moderate rhetoric by 
Pericles for democratic empire provided a basis for the more 
aggressive rhetoric adopted by Athenians later in the war.  The 
rhetorical tactics needed to maintain popular support for imperial 
policies when war fortunes wane can produce commitments to the 
principle that “might makes right” in a dangerous world where the 
same people starts to feel their powers.  The dynamics of imperial 
politics almost inevitably call forth the reasoning of Pericles’ final 
speech, and this rhetoric easily becomes a justification for 
expanded commitments and a total reliance on power as the basis 
for security. 
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Two particular lessons from Thucydides’ account of the Athenian 
attempt to hold both democratic commitments and an imperial 
policy simultaneously may be worth considering at this point.  
First, in democracies, domestic politics confound foreign policies.  
Thus shifts in public moods require shifting rhetorical strategies 
like those of Pericles or Bush, and these shifts, in turn, stay open to 
manipulation by outsiders who try to turn internal politics to their 
own advantage.  Second, imperial foreign policies disaggregate 
private and public goods, forcing people to choose between them.  
This tends in turn to undermine the sense of political cohesion 
needed for domestic tranquility as well as foreign perseverance. 
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In democracies, domestic politics always distort the presentation 
of foreign policies.  Some might think this point too obvious to 
mention.  Others dismiss it or argue that we should be able to rise 
above it.  The Thucydidean account of Athens demonstrates the 
problems with failing to take it seriously.  Forde’s gloss on one 
particular incident in the Peloponnesian War brings the 
contemporary importance of this consideration into focus. Egesta 
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was a city in Sicily allied with Athens. In 416 bce, Egesta sent 
envoys to Athens asking for help against their neighbors and 
enemies, the Syracusans.  The Egestans knew that the Athenians 
feared a Spartan attack, and insisted that, if Athens did not help by 
destroying the Egestan enemies, including the powerful city of 
Syracuse, the Syracusans would win in Sicily then join Sparta in 
destroying the Athenian empire (6.6.2-3).  By saying that Athenian 
help in Sicily was necessary to keep Athens secure, the Egestans 
explicitly framed their request in terms of the purpose cited by 
Athenians for their empire, thus using Athenian rhetoric to pull 
Athens into another far-away fray.  Open processes for 
policymaking invite any foreign power to play the domestic 
politics of democracies to its own advantage.  Claims like Egesta’s 
insistence that its enemies were planning to join the Spartans in a 
future assault on Athens are notoriously difficult to confirm and 
nearly impossible to discredit. 
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Thucydides illustrates the intractability of this problem by 
emphasizing two claims that the Egestans made in order to secure 
Athenian aid.  First, they said that great sums of money in the 
treasuries of Sicilian cities would be Athens’ for the taking, so that 
invading Sicily would pay for itself.  Second, they said that the 
other cities of Sicily were internally divided and thus likely to fall 
with the lightest of pushes.  An Athenian fact-finding group 
dispatched to discover the truth of these claims returned with a 
report that was as “attractive as it was untrue” (6.8.1-2).  It was 
misled by clever manipulation and its own hopes of spoils from a 
Sicilian invasion.  There are remarkable similarities to claims by 
Iraqi expatriates, most infamously Ahmed Chalabi, who persuaded 
the Bush administration to invade Iraq:  Saddam Hussein had 
both the strength and the plans to launch or sponsor terrorist acts 
against American interests in the short-term future (not true); his 
regime was weak, corrupt, and ready to fall (true); Americans 
would be welcomed as liberators of Iraq (not so true); and 
revenues from Iraq’s oil industry would pay for the invasion and 
then some, making it revenue-neutral or perhaps even profitable 
(not at all true). 
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The Athenians were not entirely uncritical, but available evidence 
could neither confirm nor rebut these claims.  As a result, the 
Athenians soon divided into competing parties based on their pre-
existing inclinations.  Each side interpreted the inadequate 
evidence based on its own presuppositions.  The recent choices 
about projecting American power have proceeded along similar 
lines.  Those inclined to war focused on evidence that the threat 
 
Joseph H. Lane Jr. 77 Poroi, 4, 2, July, 2005 
was great and immediate, and that the war would be easy and 
cheap.  Those less inclined to foreign adventures assumed the 
opposite.  As citizens, none of us knew whether Saddam Hussein 
had weapons of mass destruction or plans to use them.  We could 
not personally verify his ties to al Qaeda or involvement in 9/11 
terrorism.  In a democracy, even so, we citizens have to make 
decisions about matters that we cannot evaluate independently.  It 
is neither surprising nor irresponsible that we tend to follow our 
pre-existing politics as we do so.  Cognitive economy leads us to 
treat inconclusive evidence as supporting our preferred positions. 
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Most so-called foreign intelligence, in ancient Athenian and 
modern America, is created and assessed mainly for its impact on 
the political balance of power at home.  It is pursued less as 
“intelligence” than as “support” for positions that parties are 
inclined to accept.  As George Soros has argued in looking back on 
recent decisions in regard to Iraq, “Participants are under the spell 
of the prevailing bias.  Events seem to confirm their beliefs, 
strengthening [even] their misconceptions” (2003, p. 65).  Political 
considerations generally dictate which stimuli enter domestic 
politics, whether from friends at home or enemies abroad.  We 
interpret foreign events mainly by their meanings for political 
parties and political issues at home.  As a result, shifting opinions 
of publics necessitate shifting rhetorics from leaders, and these 
dominate foreign as well as domestic policies in democracies. 
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This is evident in the narrative rhythm of Thucydides’ History.  It 
is punctuated by sharp shifts between Athenian heights of power 
or enthusiasm and Athenian depths of fear, confusion, or self-
doubt.  Often the changes are abrupt.  Only days after the 
Athenians were “enflamed” into their most “daring” war and voted 
in overwhelming numbers for an unprecedented armament to 
invade Sicily, they recalled Alcibiades, the general who was to lead 
the attack, on the suspicion that he might have undemocratic 
sympathies.  Discussing such erratic politics, Forde shows how, 
over the course of the History, the periods between mood 
fluctuations shrink until the Athenians appear to be in perpetual 
vibration between a bold disregard for danger and the opinion of 
others and a near paranoia about the intentions of domestic 
friends and foreign adversaries alike. 
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Attempts to construct and maintain the popular agreement 
necessary for stable policy pose the greatest threats to 
preconditions for democracy.  To read Thucydides’ History as the 
“tragedy of Athens” warns us that the political requirements of a 
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preemptive imperialism to protect a democracy against threats 
from abroad eventually can undermine a democracy from within.  
Intensified appeals to a unique national character may sustain for 
a time a sense of the special significance of our freedom, to 
ennoble sacrifices offered for our greatness, but they can diminish 
the ideal that freedom matters for others.  Forde’s gloss on 
Thucydides is that the Athenians begin the war committed to an 
arguably noble goal (preservation of their democracy as the most 
beautiful form of regime) as well as a practical goal (preservation 
of their power in the form of an empire to buffer them against 
Spartan and Persian aggression).  As the war proceeds, practical 
and imperial considerations are confounded, and they overwhelm 
others until eventually the Athenians vote away their democracy to 
create an oligarchy claiming it may impose the discipline needed to 
conduct the war successfully.  The imperial policy inverted means 
and ends.  The war urged as necessary to save democracy in 
Athens ultimately results in Athenian rejection of democracy in 
order to win the war. 
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This sobering account of ancient Athens may not be a perfect 
match for modern America, yet it yields points of reference for 
making inferences about how rhetorics for current policies may 
impact American ideas and institutions.  Many commentators say 
that challenges of the war on terrorism differ from any in 
American history, but few can say what this might mean for 
America in the long run.  This trajectory, which may be as evident 
in America today as in Athens in the early stages of the war, is one 
that we should not dismiss out of hand. 
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The rhetoric of empire led Athens from democracy to oligarchy:  to 
government by the so-called “Four Hundred.”  Forde reads 
Thucydides to show that oligarchy appears as a desperate measure 
to secure the polity, which becomes persuaded that the “fickle and 
untrustworthy” democracy cannot adhere to a consistent policy 
(1989, p. 141).  Oligarchy offers the discipline required for the 
victory needed to protect the polity.  So the installation of the 
oligarchy appears, at first, as a reasonable and necessary measure.  
In presenting it in this way, the History puts its readers in the 
position of Athenians who, feeling the pressure of a war going 
wrong, change their form of government to gain the right 
leadership for winning the war.  Forde even takes seriously the 
possibility that Thucydides provided an apology for the Four 
Hundred by presenting its leaders as men of “virtue” whose first 
goal was to save Athens. 
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Yet Forde also shows how Thucydides revealed the corruption of 
these talented and well-educated people.  They first took power 
because they believed that their talents, particularly their political 
realism and their ability to stay the course, were needed to save 
Athens.  In time, their self-interests diverged from requirements of 
the public good.  Given demands that imperial policies placed on 
Athens, Forde argues, the decision to entrust power to the 
oligarchy may seem “a great display of public spirit.”  That the 
oligarchy degenerated into self-interested rule by a small minority 
“is certainly a fact,” however, “and not even a surprising fact” (p. 
141). 
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We would do well to view the two speeches of Pericles already 
discussed plus their American cognates in the context of a third 
speech for which I know no American parallel.  It is arguably the 
most important speech for understanding Thucydides’ teaching on 
democratic empire, and it is a major fulcrum for most analysts of 
the History – including Forde, Bruell, Orwin, and Strauss.  It is the 
speech of an otherwise unknown character:  Diodotus, son of 
Eucrates.4 
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After the submission of Mytilene, once a leading ally of Athens, the 
assembly voted to kill all Mytilenians to warn that Athens is not to 
be trifled with.  After a day to reflect on this, Athenians were seized 
with remorse and met to soften their stance.  Diodotus spoke after 
Cleon, the foremost hawk, “the most violent man at Athens, and at 
that time by far the most powerful with the People” (3.36.6ff), had 
excoriated people for even suggesting that they might reconsider 
the death sentence.  To understand Diodotus requires an 
appreciation of the unique dilemmas that he faced in speaking 
after Cleon. 
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Cleon upbraided Athenians in the harshest terms, insisting that 
they must hold the line and impose the full penalty on the 
Mytilenians.  Even though justice might require mercy, Cleon 
argued that Athenians, threatened by the defection of allies in a 
dangerous world, must follow self-interest.  They must send a 
message that the wrath of Athens would be ruinous to rebels.  No 
one, he reasoned, should doubt the resolve of Athens, and its 
actions must make that clear to all.  Anticipating the rhetoric of 
some recent Americans, Cleon’s was a “rambling, vehement, and 
contradictory” insistence that Athens must guard against 
dangerous “elites” persuading the people to be too easy on the 
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Mytilenians.  “He forcefully argues that all who would speak for 
repeal of the decree are traitors to the people, and he thus seeks to 
cow them into silence” (Orwin 1994, p. 144).  Thus he put his 
opponents in a difficult, if not impossible, position:  if they spoke 
against offensive measures, they risked being seen as enemy 
sympathizers.  “If incoherent in theory,” Orwin observes, “this 
works admirably in practice” by appealing “to the two harshest 
passions:  fear and anger” (p. 194).5 
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Cleon’s warning relates closely to the stark rhetoric that the 
Athenians employ in the infamous Melian dialogue.  The 
Athenians were utterly transformed by their own rhetoric into 
believing that security only exists in power and that all increases 
in power are increases in security.  On a foreign policy level, it is 
analogous to President Bush’s insistence that “the only way to 
defeat the terrorists is to stay on the offensive, attacking wherever 
they might be.”6 
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Cleon’s critique makes the distinction that separates Athens from 
Melos into a division within Athenian democracy.  Hence it marks 
a turning point for the imperial democracy of Athens, as seen by 
Thucydides, with discussion eventually replaced altogether by civil 
war as the modus operandi of Athenian policymaking.  Athenian 
democracy became a casualty of its own imperial strategy for self-
defense.  I would like to think that even the most staunch 
supporters of President Bush’s interventionist policies are at least 
a little dismayed by feeling forced to denounce American policy 
opponents as “in league with the terrorists,” but this has become a 
common usage nevertheless. 
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Some of the harshest instances of such framing measures have 
succeeded.  Saxby Chambliss unseated U.S. Senator Max Cleland 
with a campaign that pictured Cleland with Osama bin Laden and 
Saddam Hussein while associating Cleland with opposition to the 
homeland-security bill that he has, in truth, helped author.  Once 
Kerry had clinched his presidential nomination, Bush launched a 
series of spots with battlefield images and ominous voices to 
suggest that Kerry’s votes were depriving U.S. troops of needed 
weapons.  These ads cast dissent as treason and undermined the 
possibility for any constructive reconsideration of policies.  
Thucydides showed that such rhetoric comes from nearly endless, 
preemptive, imperial wars.  Every time we blur the lines between 
fellow citizens and foreign enemies, we should reflect on Forde’s 
argument that a key theme of Thucydides is the way in which 
preemptive imperialism dissolved the bonds that sustained a 
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shared democracy in Athens. 
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Courtesy of Cleon, any counsel of restraint that Diodotus might 
have wanted to offer, had already been cast as treason.  This made 
all the more remarkable his ability to restrain the passions of 
Athenians.  He appealed openly and effectively to qualities that 
had been the pride of Athenians:  their strength, realism, and 
willingness to endure risks to advance their interests.  Facing the 
possibility that any focus on justice had been foreclosed by Cleon, 
with any solicitude for the Mytilenians now treated as treason, 
Diodotus prudently announced that he would set aside all claims 
of justice to speak only about Athenian interests. 
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Diodotus began with the sobering claim that “Plain good advice 
has thus come to be no less suspected than bad; and the advocate 
of the most monstrous measures is not more obliged to use deceit 
to gain the people than the best counselor is to be in order to be 
believed” (3.43.2).  As the plain provider of good advice, he 
engaged the angry passions incited by Cleon by appealing to them.  
He rejected the relevance of justice, insisting that the only true 
measure of policy must be Athenian self-interest.  He held that the 
Athenians should show no scruple about using force to advance 
their interests, but he added that they should avoid offensive 
actions that undermine Athenian security (3.46).  Orwin claims 
that “Diodotus’ true difference with Cleon is not over whether 
punishment deters, but over how reliably it does so and how to 
manage it so as to enhance its reliability” (1994, pp. 148-150). 
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Among major Athenian speakers in the History, only Diodotus 
reconciled all the ideas and passions that drove the Athenians.  For 
the moment, at least, he synthesized the strength of Athens with 
its decency or gentleness.  He did so by conceding that the 
apparent “candor” and harshness of his opponent is attractive and 
offers some rhetorical advantage in the affairs of empire when 
“trust” is essential to effective guidance in foreign affairs.  Thus he 
accepted, as Orwin puts it, “the permanent necessity of what we 
call ‘image politics’” (p. 162). 
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Diodotus succeeded in identifying his view with that of ordinary 
Athenians.  By this route, he persuaded them to adopt, however 
briefly, a perspective apart from patriotism.  He enabled them to 
see the position they shared with adversaries, even as he appears 
to accept the most strident patriotism:  the ruthless concern for 
nothing beyond the polity’s self-interest.  He showed Athens why 
treating enemies harshly would make them more, not less, likely to 
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carry rebellions to the worst possible conclusion:  forcing Athens 
to absorb “the expense of a siege” only to “receive a ruined city 
from which we can no longer draw the revenue which forms our 
real strength against the enemy” (3.46.3). 
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Orwin explains that the method of Diodotus is explicitly amoral 
but still grounds itself in “the still, small voice of justice” (1994, p. 
154).  Advising Athenians on their interests, Diodotus reminded 
them that the Mytilenians (especially the ones who did not begin 
the rebellion against Athens but joined in trying to save their city 
once Athens placed it under siege) were essentially like the 
Athenians.  “Diodotus’ speech thus cures us alike of our 
indignation at others who disregard our good in favor of theirs and 
of our qualm at preferring our good to theirs” (p. 157), while 
showing how the others are like us (pp. 153-154).  Thus Diodotus 
forged an elegant, if fragile, consensus for justice.  He constructed 
this public commitment under the guise of self-interest to 
undermine the dangerous effects of jingoistic rhetoric in the 
Funeral Oration, to sate fears aroused by the darker, final speech 
of Pericles, and to sidestep the trap imposed by Cleon. 
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This example might be cited to suggest that contemporary anti-
war activists fail to persuade most Americans in part because they 
are not as clever as Diodotus.  A rhetoric that begins by 
denouncing the injustice of American policy is doomed to failure.  
It misses how Americans think the war in Iraq is about realism:  
“We must attack to be secure.”  Critics must take the power of that 
widely credited claim into account.  They must take seriously the 
pervasive belief that “we have to attack them there before they 
attack us here.”  Americans who regard themselves as realists 
dismiss anti-war protesters as soft-headed moralists who fail to 
face hard realities.  These realists are easily persuaded when 
President Bush shrugs off criticisms by saying that “you can’t win a 
war if you don’t believe in fighting.”  Diodotus’s speech can be 
cited as evidence that effective criticisms must refute the realist 
arguments on their own grounds:  by showing how “we are not 
safer” as a result of preemptive war. 
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Lest we be too tempted, however, by Diodotus’s rhetoric of 
realism, though, we must recognize how Diodotus reinforces 
Cleon’s harsh reasoning.  By operating within the limits of Cleon’s 
demagogic insistence that those who speak against his policies are 
unpatriotic and untrustworthy, Diodotus cures his listeners of 
their “indignation at others who disregard our good in favor of 
theirs.”  But Diodotus equally absolves his listeners of any “qualms 
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at preferring our good to theirs” (p. 157).  By showing how 
Mytileneans are like Athenians in pursuing their own interests, 
Diodotus persuaded the Athenians that they should not hate 
Mytileneans for resisting Athens and countered Cleon’s suggestion 
that anybody who believed Mytileneans to wish no ill for Athens 
must be naïve and unpatriotic.  Yet this approach licensed 
Athenians to indulge their most self-interested impulses.  The 
irony is that Diodotus averted one potential Melos only to endorse 
rhetoric that led straight to more.  Once the Athenians decided 
their interests would be truly served by killing Melians, Diodotus’s 
arguments offered no obstacle. 
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The Diodotus case is complicated.  Successful advocacy against any 
counter-productive aggression in defense of a democracy requires 
a tone of realism, but it also demands an effective appeal to 
sentiments of justice, however submerged they might seem in the 
popular conscience.  For us, this requires some echo for the 
familiar charge that current opposition to the U.S. springs from 
unjust impulses or ingratitude by foreigners who refuse to 
cooperate with America.  We can see this in letters to the editor 
that ask, “Have the protesters forgotten September 11?”  We can 
hear it in popular criticism of the ingratitude shown by the French, 
whose disdain for American policy in Iraq is taken to show that 
they have forgotten their rescue by Americans in World War II.  
Diodotus echoed popular equivalents that animated the 
Athenians.  Like Diodotus, we need a rhetoric that can dignify such 
sentiments, even ground itself in them, while showing them to be 
“compatible with, and to some extent conducive to, a certain 
gentleness” (Bruell 1974a, p. 16). 
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Arguments for restraint must not offend our pride in our realism 
and resolution.  Still we must recognize that such rhetoric stays 
problematic because it reinforces principles that can have 
disastrous consequences when enacted by people who pride 
themselves on being hard.  Rhetorics of self-interested realism are 
difficult even for democracies to stop short of imperial 
domination. 
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There are many differences between ourselves and ancient 
Athenians. I have made no attempt to consider how American 
appeals to “natural rights” might temper the harsher qualities that 
empire breeds.  Given that we are the first nation of imperial might 
that is explicitly (or ostensibly) devoted to a natural rights 
 
Joseph H. Lane Jr. 84 Poroi, 4, 2, July, 2005 
philosophy, we might think that our future history will provide the 
first accurate data on that question.  In September of 2004, 
President Bush added to his stump speech the image that America 
is on a “march of freedom.”  He regularly declares that “America is 
safest when freedom is on the march,” and he proclaims as an 
applause line that “Freedom is on the march in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.”  It is safe to say that this “march of freedom” limits 
devotion to “natural rights.”  Advocates of natural or human rights 
have criticized the constitutionality and advisability of the Patriot 
Act, but the Bush administration seems to find liberty less in 
respecting rights at home than in assertive action abroad to ensure 
security – freedom itself is understood as freedom from threats 
external and internal, and the suppression of any forces that may 
undermine security, whether they are domestic or foreign, is 
justified as the prerequisite of “freedom.”  The excusing of the role 
that high-ranking officials played in Abu Ghraib and our other 
military detention centers implies a low priority for natural or 
human rights, at least for those who may be construed as enemies 
of American freedom, and there is little respect of any kind 
apparent in the fact that the United States neither counts nor 
apologizes for the casualties of non-American civilians in Iraq or 
Afghanistan. 
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That said, the contrapuntal dance between fear and power, or 
danger and destiny, keeps us in the rhetorical realm of 
Thucydides.  Straussian commentaries see the History as favoring 
the speech of Diodotus:  His was the counsel that would serve 
Athenians best if only they would follow it with his characteristic 
“gentleness.”  Yet Forde’s account of Thucydides’ portrait of 
Athens’ transformation by imperial war suggests that the Diodotus 
counsel declined in success as the policies of democratic 
imperialism advanced.  Following an imperial strategy can render 
a democracy less capable of heeding the best advice, even when it 
comes cleverly packaged by a brilliant rhetorician who appears out 
of nowhere as a “gift of god.”  We must hope to hear such speakers, 
and particularly the best, if hidden, elements of their speeches.  
Perhaps they can tell us how to address our legitimate fears while 
tempering our enormous powers.  Perhaps we can heed their 
appeals to show justice and gentleness toward others. 
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I have no memory of what I thought of all of this, if I thought of 
any of this, when I was reading Thucydides and Forde’s 
commentary on him back in the winter of 1989-1990 as a twenty-
one year old college senior.  I wonder why I wasn’t more impressed 
by parallels between the rhetorical dynamics of American politics 
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then and Forde’s analysis of Thucydides’ Athens.  Perhaps, I, like 
so many others, was fascinated and distracted by the brilliant 
twilight of the Cold War that the Marshall-Halle readings of 
Thucydides’ stories had become too familiar, thus allowing me to 
slide all too easily into seeing everything through well-prepared 
categories and prejudices.  Perhaps, the Soviet threat, more 
obviously analogous to Sparta as a potent adversary who might 
truly defeat us, placed me more firmly into the Athenian position, 
making me (as the Athenians were) more “in the moment,” more 
afraid of losing the impending battles and less likely to think about 
the long-term impacts of our rhetoric on our politics. 
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But when I returned to Forde’s commentary in 2003, when the 
familiar categories of my college days had been rendered largely 
moot and when new challenges to my ways of thinking were 
appearing daily, I was reminded that to read Thucydides can be to 
question our assumptions.  He wrote a cautionary tale about a 
democratic people, devoted to liberty, who became the only ones 
in the world able to “go where they please, without . . . any other 
nation on earth being able to stop them” (2.62.2).  He showed how 
the fear and envy of others but especially their own ambition and 
aggression undid their democracy and their empire.  Thucydides 
insisted that anything human “will at some time or other and in 
much the same ways, repeat itself.”  It will not always repeat itself, 
nor will it repeat itself in all the same ways.  What is constant, he 
said, is human nature; but within that constraint, he held that 
many variations on human themes may occur. 
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It is vain to trust that we are somehow better human beings than 
those Thucydides depicts in the Athenian assembly.  But 
Thucydides can help us learn from them.  From the History, we 
can learn about the short-sighted decisions that appear inevitable 
to those held hostage by the categories that they use to justify their 
own imperial policies.  We can learn about losing the individual 
liberty and self-actualization that have provided for our self-
confident action in the world.  We can learn about the political 
pitfalls that lurk in adopting a partial and self-serving realism as 
the idiom of our political rhetoric and the justification for our 
political actions.  Our judgment, the intellectual capacity most 
cultivated by education in the liberal arts, can be educated by the 
Athens of Thucydides.  As political theorists we must put our 
training and our traditions to work in crafting a rhetoric that can 
undo the logic that now leads America from democracy to empire 
and, all too possibly, disaster. 
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 Notes  
 
 
 
1     When I presented an earlier form of this analysis, a scholar of 
international relations suggested that I could shrink the essay by 
citing the Defense Department’s strategic planning documents 
rather than individual speeches by President George W. Bush.  
True, but this would defeat my purpose.  In Thucydides, we see 
how a public debate about the necessity of empire can occur in a 
more or less democratic environment.  I want us to see that debate 
as a factor contributing to our own situation, but I also want us to 
assess it as a possible basis for understanding our situation.  If the 
political speeches most heard by Americans are among our most 
common sources of ideas about what we are doing in foreign 
affairs, the challenge is to see how they (rather than the 
government plans circulated among bureaucrats) explain 
American foreign policy.  Thus to compare Thucydides speeches 
for Athenians with Bush speeches to Americans enables us to see 
ourselves in the distant mirror of old stories “less propaganda than 
the setting of previous actions in a context that helped the 
collectivity better appreciate what it was doing to itself and to 
others” (Euben 1990, p. 52). 
 
 
 
 
2     Bush repeated this particular call to “change the world” several 
times in his press conference on April 14, 2004.  Some say that 
post-invasion troubles in Iraq have chastened policy talk of 
imperialism, but the President’s speech on July 13, 2004 at 
Northern Michigan University and his broad appeal to the “march 
of freedom” in his 2005 Inaugural show that he still argues for 
“remaking the world.”  Rhetorical shifts from broad, positive, and 
programmatic accounts of American intentions to more limited, 
negative, and defensive accounts seem to be spurred by shifts in 
domestic politics, not changes of heart. 
 
 
 
 
3     On whether Athenian imperialism was ideological, see Orwin’s 
discussion (1994, p. 149, especially note 10) of Marc Cogan’s The 
Human Thing:  The Speeches and Principles of Thucydides’ 
History (1981).  Like Orwin, I think that it anachronistic to find 
ideological motives in the modern sense in the Athenian position.  
Furthermore Forde’s argument calls into question the tenability of 
any ideological empire, so there also is room to question whether 
American motives are ideological. 
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4     On the importance of the names of father (“he who is properly 
strong”) and son (“gift of Zeus”), see Corsi (1974) and Bruell 
(1974b).  
 
 
 
5      Mendelsohn (2004) does a masterful job of showing how both 
Kagan and Davis praise the “wisdom” of Cleon’s speeches while 
failing to give proper weight to the criticisms that Thucydides 
made of Cleon’s character and reasoning.  On the wisdom of 
Diodotus and his connection to Thucydides, see Forde (1989, pp. 
40ff), Bruell (1974a, pp.16-17), and Orwin (1994, chapter 7). 
 
 
 
 
6     This statement, offered in the second presidential debate on 
October 9, 2004, echoes similar sentences repeated as part of the 
President’s standard stump speech during the fall of 2004.  
                        
 
